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What Constitutes Prejudicial
Publicity In Pending Cases
By JAMEs R. RICHARDSON*
The Problem
Restriction of the press in early colonial America may be
typified by the report of Sir William Berkeley, governor of Vir-
ginia, in his report to the Lords of Committee for the Colonies in
1671 in which he stated:
I thank God we have not free schools nor printing; and I
hope we shall not have these hundred years. For learning has
brought disobedience and heresy, and sects into the world;
and printing has divulged them and libels against the govern-
ment. God keep us from both.'
We examine the other side of the coin to bring the problem
into full focus. Both in the Ecclesiastical Courts and in the Star
Chamber during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in
England trial by inquisition, rather than the accusatorial process,
was a common practice. Under this state of affairs, it was the trial
of John Lilburn which led to the origin and development of the
privilege against self-incrimination-the very heart of impartial
trials under concepts of due process of law. Lilburn was charged,
ex-officio, with printing and importing seditious books and litera-
ture.2 At the trial, Lilburn was examined as to matters about
which he had not been charged. For that reason he refused to
answer, stating:
Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, B.S., LL.B., LL.M., Yale.
'Lee, History of American Journalism, p. 50. Instructions granting co-
lonial governors their authority included the following mandate: and forasmuch
a eat inconvenience may arise by liberty of printing within our said territory
un er your government you are to provide by all necessary orders that no person
keep any printing press for printing, nor that any book, pamphlet,-or other mat-
ters whatsoever be printed without your especial leave and license first obtained.
-Duniway, The Development of Freedom of the Press in Massachusetts, p. 65
(1906). See also, Thayer, Legal Control of the Press, 43 (2d ed. 1962).2 Lilburas Trial, 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (1637).
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I am not willing to answer you to any more of these
questions, because I see you go about by this Examination to
insnare me: for seeing the things for which I am imprisoned
cannot be proved against me, you will get other matter out of
my examination: and therefore if you will not ask me about
the thing laid to my charge, I shall answer no more.3
For his obstreperous behavior, Lilburn was whipped and pil-
loried. Four years later, however, he was awarded £ 3000 in
reparation by Parliament after the Court of High Commission
and Star Chamber was abolished.4
These historical references highlight governmental stifling of
the press and the mockery of fair trial in the past. They demon-
strate the need for a change if men are to enjoy freedom in a
democratic society. In consequence, both federal and state
governments have secured for the people freedom of the
press." Similarly, all citizens are guaranteed impartial trials under
constitutional concepts of due process of law.6 On the theory that
rights and duties are correlative, freedoms of speech and of the
press have always been regarded as qualified rights.7 This is so
because in the exercise of self-expression or communication it is
almost inevitable that the rights of others may be involved. But
in a criminal prosecution, where the force of the state is brought
to bear on one accused of crime, the right to a fair trial is
8 Id. at 1318.
4 Inbau, Self-Incrimination 4 (Thomas, pub.) (1950), points out the influence
of the populr rebellion against inquisitorial practices.
5 In the United States, freedom of the press finds authority in the U. S.Const. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press .... A typical state constitutional provision is La. Coust.
art. 1, § 3: "No law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech
or of the press; any person may speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty."
6 In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
.and public trial, by an impartial ury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertainedby law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining Witnesses in. his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.-U.S. Const. Amend. VI; ".. . nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . :---U.S. Const.
amend, XIV.
7U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The constitutional liberty of speech and of the
press, as we understand it, implies the right to freely utter and publish whatever
the citizen may please, and to be protected against any responsibility for so doing,
except so far as such publications, from their blasphemy, obscenity, or scandalous
character, may be a public offense, or as by their falsehood and malice they mayinjuriously affect the standing, reputation or pecuniary interests of individuals.
2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations p. 886. (8th ed. 1927).
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absolute.8 It follows, then, that in criminal prosecutions, which
are publicized through various means of disseminating news there
is a direct confrontation between two fundamental constitutional
rights.
Freedom of the Press v. Due Process of Law
Newspapers unfettered and unafraid tend to insure the prin-
ciples of a democratic government. A censored press is symbolic
of a despotic government. In the United States and component
states a free press is constitutionally guaranteed; but any serious
student of journalism and government should realize the relativity
of such guarantees. The various media of thought communication
have rights, but these rights may be abused and so cease in parti-
cular cases to be rights or privileges.9
Freedom of the press, properly conceived, is basic to our con-
stitutional system. And safeguards for the fair administration of
criminal justice are enshrined in state and federal bills of rights.
Respect for both of these indispensable elements of our constitu-
tional system present some of the most difficult and delicate pro-
blems for adjudication when they are before our courts for
determination. It has taken centuries of struggle in an attempt to
evolve our system for bringing the guilty to book, protecting the
innocent, and maintaining the interests of society consonant with
our democratic professions.
One of the demands of a democratic society is that the public
should know what goes on in courts by being told by the press
what happens, there to the end that the public may judge whether
our system of criminal justice is fair and right. On the other hand,
our society has set apart court and jury as the tribunal for
determining guilt or innocence on the basis of evidence adduced
in court so far as it is humanly possible. It would, then, be the
grossest perversion of all that Mr. Justice Holmes represents to
suggest that it is also true of the thought behind a criminal charge
"... that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get it-
8 A denial of a fair and impartial trial, as guaranteed by the sixth Amendmefnt
constitutes a denial of due process demanded by the fourteenth Aiiendment, and
failure to strictly observe this constitutional safeguard renders a trial and conviction
illegal and void, and redress therefor is within the ambit of habeas corpus.-Lane
v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 320 F. 2d 179 (4th Cir. 1963).9 See Thayer, Legal Control of the Press (2nd. ed. 1962), Preface, p. vii.
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self accepted in the competition of the market ... ",10 In actuality,
proceedings for the determination of guilt or innocence in open
court are not, and should not be, in competition with any other
means for establishing the charge. It follows, then, that an im-
partial trial, under concepts of due process of law, should have
precedence over freedoms of speech and press when comment,
written or oral, on pending litigation would amount to prejudicial
publicity, or what is popularly known as "trial by newspaper," to
which must be added radio and television due to scientific devel-
opments in the field of electronics. Our task, then, is to determine
what constitutes prejudicial publicity in the light of available con-
trols.
The Problem Illustrated
To illustrate the problem, let us consider a contempt pro-
ceeding in England against the London Daily Mirror." One
Haigh, a Mirror-labeled "Modem Bluebeard," was in custody
charged with murder. The Mirror published an article in which,
for stated reasons, Haigh was called a "vampire" and reference
was made to other murders purportedly committed by Haigh.
Furthermore, a photograph of one alleged victim was published
with a description of the method used to kill. In an action to bring
the Mirror to account, on a writ procured by Haigh, the editor
was jailed and the publisher was fined £ 10,000 for contempt.
The issue was not as to the truth or falsity of the publication, but
whether the matter so publicized had made it difficult for Haigh
to have a fair trial. And, in the course of the opinion, it was
stated that the punishment meted out was not to vindicate the
dignity of the court, but rather to prevent undue interference with
the administration of justice through pandering to sensationalism
for the purpose of increasing the newspaper's circulation.
A situation which was basically similar, though more extreme,
received different treatment in this country. 12 This case involved
allegedly improper radio comment on a case in which an eleven-
10Quoting Holmes in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
11The Times (London), Mar. 26, 1949, p. 8, col 1. The account is in-
cluded in part in the appendix to the opinion, Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show,
Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 930-932 (1950). The decision is of a divisional court of the
King's Bench.
12 Baltimore Radio Show. Inc. v. State 193 (Md., 300, 67 A. 2d 497, (1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912, (1952).
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year-old girl was found brutally murdered, only a few days after
a child murder in the nearby city of Washington had received
much publicity. With public feeling running high in the com-
munity, a radio news commentator had gone on the air and ad-
vised his listeners "to stand by for a sensation."
The commentator then proceeded to relate that one James
had been arrested and had confessed to commission of the crime.
While James was awaiting the process of investigation, indictment,
and trial, a series of broadcasts followed in which he was identi-
fied by name, age, race, and address-which address, it was pointed
out, was conveniently near the scene of the crime. It was stated in
these broadcasts that James had confessed to a previous assault on
a white woman, and that he had previously served time in prison
for attacking a ten-year-old girl.
Clearly, the broadcasts actually advised potential jurors on
facts that would be incompetent evidence at the trial and on other
matter that would be competent only under certain conditions.13
The attorneys for the defendant, well-knowing that public opinion
was weighted against him, waived a jury trial and relied on a de-
fense of insanity which proved unavailing with a resultant death
penalty.
These broadcasts in regard to the offense committed by James
constituted the basis for a contempt charge on the grounds that
they tended to unduly influence any trial jury that might be
chosen to hear the facts, thus obstructing the impartial admini-
stration of justice. The Maryland Appellate Court held that the
radio station's conduct, through its employees, did not constitute
a "clear and present danger" to the fair and orderly administration
of justice in that the court would not assume as a matter of law
that either judges or jurors would entertain or be influenced by
considerations which under their oaths they were bound to dis-
regard. Upon application to the Supreme Court of the United
States the writ of certiorari was denied.
Existing Controls
In the English case discussed above we saw the power to
punish for contempt of court exercised while in .the American
13 The confession would be incompetent unless voluntary and evidence of
other crimes is as a general rule inadmissible.
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case, where news comment was more vigorous, exercise of the
contempt power was denied. This divergence of judicial action
may seem hard to rationalize in view of our common judicial
heritage with England and the fact that England has what is
generally regarded as a free press. The answer is found in the
resultant clash between two great constitutional principles-free-
dom of the press and due process of law: a clash between two
rights-not between right and wrong, where, in the latter case,
the issues may be clear cut.
Traditionally, courts have protected the course of trials from
the exercise of most improper influences through the power to
punish for contempt of court. This is not so, however, with respect
to the publicizing of trials, even by slanted comments by the
various agencies that disseminate news. In fact, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, in concurring with an opinion written by Mr. Justice
Clark, concluded by stating:
This Court has not yet decided that the fair administration
of criminal justice must be subordinated to another safeguard
of our constitutional system-freedom of the press, properly
conceived. The Court has not yet decided that, while con-
victions must be reversed and miscarriages of justice result
because the minds of jurors or potential jurors where poisoned,
the poisoner is constitutionally protected in plying his trade.14
This thought-provoking statement indicates that the Supreme
Court has not closed the door on the right of trial courts to punish
newspapers and newscasters for contempt due to comment deemed
prejudicial. But, in actuality, the door is opened the merest crack
through application of the "clear and present danger to the
orderly administration of justice" test. This test was first applied
in the trial of labor union leader Harry Bridges where a news-
,paper editorial resulted in a conviction for contempt of court,
which was reversed upon review under a writ of certiorari.1 5
The defendants, union members, were found guilty of charges
of assault and battery. The editorial appeared in print pending
a hearing on sentencing and motion to probate. It was entitled,
"Probation for Gorillas?" There followed a vigorous denounce-
ment of the two labor union members who had been found
14 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961).
15 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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guilty of assaulting non-union truck drivers. The writer then
concluded, "Judge A. A. Scott will make a serious mistake if he
grants probation to Matthew Shannon and Keenan Holmes. The
community needs the example of their sentence to the jute mill."
In reversing the contempt conviction, the writer of the
majority opinion stated that this editorial would not influence a
mind of reasonable fortitude. He then continued to the effect that
an inherent tendency or reasonable tendency of an out of court
publication to obstruct the orderly administration of justice is
not enough. There must be a clear and present danger, i.e., the
evil likely to result must be extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished as
a contempt of court. We will not argue with the decision in view
of the facts upon which it is based. And perhaps Justice Douglas'
observation "that . . . the law of contempt is not made for the
protection of judges who may be sensitive to the winds of public
opinion. Judges are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to
thrive in a hardy climate"16 is correct. One cannot but wonder
if a contempt charge would not have been upheld had an
individual written a letter to the judge containing the substance
of the editorial; or if a person had slipped such a writing to a
juror while the trial was in progress.
If, due to Supreme Court decisions, we must for all practical
purposes rule out contempt of court as a means of suppressing
prejudicial publicity, what then is left as a means of securing a
fair hearing in highly publicized trials? The traditional procedures
of new trial, change of venue and continuance are still available.
One or another of these procedural points may or may not be
effective in a given case.
Let us consider a case in point on writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court in which the petitioner, under sentence of death
for murder, claimed that his conviction was obtained in violation
of his right to a fair trial under the fourteenth amendment.17
16 Craig v. Harney. 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947).17 hIvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). In Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S.
331 (1946), a newspaper publisher was found guilty of contempt of court. The
aper published editorials which were extremely critical of a .circuit courts
handling of indictments for rape and bookmaking. One was accompanied by a
cartoon caricaturing the judge as a robed compliant figure on the bench, dis-
pensing justice with one hand while catering to criminal elements, through
acceptance of bribes, with the other. Certiorari was granted to review the peti-(Contlnued on next page)
1966]
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Six homicides in and around Evansville, Indiana in the late part
of 1954 and the early part of 1955, caused indignation to be
aroused throughout the county. The petitioner was arrested and
confessed to the six killings. He was tried on one count of the
indictment that followed and received the death penalty.
Shortly after the arrest, the sheriff made a press release stating
that Irvin, the petitioner, had made a full confession. The press,
radio and television stations then had a field day. Their editorials
and broadcasts reviewed Irvin's criminal record over a twenty
year period. They referred to convictions for arson and burglary,
and a court-martial for being 'AWOL' during the war. Against
this backdrop of bitter prejudice fanned by various news media,
Irvin went to trial. The trial court exhausted a panel of 430 per-
sons before a jury of twelve was selected. Two-thirds of the jurors
selected to try the case had an opinion that the petitioner was
guilty and were familiar with the material facts involved-includ-
ing the fact that other murders were attributed to him. Some went
so far as to say that it would take evidence to overcome their belief
of guilt. One said that he "could not give the defendant the
benefit of the doubt that he was innocent." Another stated that
he had a "somewhat fixed opinion as to the defendant's guilt."
Under this state of circumstances the Supreme Court granted
the writ of habeas corpus and held that the petitioner should
have been granted a change of venue. However, the Court said
that in these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of
communication, an important case can be expected to arouse the
interest of the public and scarcely any of those best qualified to
serve as jurors will not have formed some impression as to the
merits of the case. The Court then made the incredible statement
that "to hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion
as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is suf-
ficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's imparti-
ality would be to establish an impossible standard."'18
By the foregoing statement, the Court, in effect, subordinates
the right to a fair trial to freedom of the press. How, we inquire,
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
tioner's claim that the publications presented a clear and present danger of
high imminence to the administration of justice. The conviction was reversed on
this ground.
Is Irvin v. Dowd, supra note 14, at 723.
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can fallible men and women reach an impartial verdict based
exclusively on what they hear in court when, before they enter
the jury box, their minds have been saturated by press and radio
for weeks or months with matter designed to establish the guilt of
the accused. A conviction so secured constitutes a denial of due
process of law in its most rudimentary conception.
If prejudicial publicity has been given to a particular case, is
a change of venue or a continuance likely to insure the fairness
of a trial? The answer has to be "quite unlikely" with respect to
change of venue in highly publicized criminal cases. This is so
because news dissemination is seldom limited to the confines of
a county. The difficulty of preserving to one accused of crime a
trial by an impartial jury made up of jurors who come to the
investigation of each case free from any preconceived impression
of it has increased in direct proportion to the admirable progress
made by the various news media in increasing the range, intensity,
and effectiveness of the gathering and dissemination of news of
events. This is not to say that change of venue to another county
cannot further the ends of justice. The residents of a county to
which a trial is removed may be just as well informed on the
crime charged as those from which the case is removed, but,
nevertheless, entertain far less prejudice.
A new trial for failure to grant a change of venue coupled with
ensuing delay which, for practical purposes, effects a continuance
can mean the difference in life and death for an accused person.
For example, in a Florida case a deaf-mute shot and killed the wife
of a county attorney who had prosecuted him for breach of
peace. 19 It was premeditated homicide and the defendant was the
subject of great hostility in the county once he was apprehended
and returned from Canada for trial. Wide radio and newspaper
coverage highly publicized the crime. These news media portrayed
the defendant as a dangerous criminal. They referred to the
placing of armed guards around the home of the attorney, prior to
apprehension of the accused; they mentioned that the Bar As-
sociation of the Circuit had posted a reward for the arrest and
conviction of the killer; they noted that a special assistant had
been appointed to aid the prosecution; they portrayed, the Accused
as a dangerous convict who occupied menial positions; and they
19 Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959).
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published details of the crime and the defendant's confession.
All prospective jurors admitted to having full knowledge of
the details of the crime. One person, who was accepted as a
juror, stated during the voir dire that "I might" be able to base
a verdict on the sworn testimony and the law of the case.
Another person, who acted as a juror, stated in the course of the
voir dire that "I think I could" render an impartial verdict. Both
agreed that they had formed and expressed an opinion on the
guilt of the accused on the basis of what they had read.
The defendant was tried and found guilty of murder in the
first degree without recommendation of mercy. This failure to
recommend mercy led automatically to imposition of a death
sentence by the court. The defendant's motion for a new trial was
denied and he appealed. The Florida Supreme Court reversed for
failure to grant a change of venue in order that the defendant be
tried by an impartial jury. The opinion of the court concluded
as follows:
In view of our finding that the evidence was sufficient to
warrant a conviction of murder in the first degree we regret
that the cause must be remanded for retrial, but the solemn
obligation placed upon us to guarantee a fair and impartial
trial to the defendant on both the issue of guilt and of mercy
requires that we must do so for the reasons above expressed.2
This writer does not feel it necessary to comment on the trial
and appeal other than to say that a cruel, senseless murder of an
innocent person was involved, and that the killer was entitled to a
fair trial under due process of law. And we cannot, under due pro-
cess of law, say, in effect, to an accused, "we will give you a fair
trial and then proceed to hang you."
The defendant's second trial took place about three years
'later in a county adjoining the one in which the homicide was
committed. The verdict was guilty of murder in the first degree
with recommendation of mercy. Under Florida law, such a ver-
dict carries a mandatory life sentence, which the defendant is now
serving. The life sentence in the second trial can be attributed
to the lengthy delay and change of venue, which in this case, as
in others, may aptly be described as "change of venom." However,
20 Id. at 80.
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the effectiveness of this procedural device may be limited by the
existence of statewide radio and newspaper coverage. This means
that if the trial is moved it may encounter existing prejudice,
though perhaps in a lesser degree.
Prejudicial Publicity
Any publicity which reasonably is calculated to prevent an
accused from having a fair trial, under the constitution, is pre-
judicial. The danger presented by any comment or publication in
regard to pending litigation, whether true or not, is that it may
improperly influence the honest and rational exercise of judgment
by triers of law and facts. And since it would be impractical to
subject judge and jury to psychological examinations in order to
determine whether certain publicity had in fact affected judg-
ment values adversely, the best that can be done is to estimate the
probabilities in terms of the data available.21 The particular facts
of a given case should be controlling in a judicial determination of
probable prejudicial influence. But there is no scientific method
for measuring the effect of propaganda on the subconscious mind.
As we have noted, the Supreme Court has recognized that news
media influence public opinion on criminal trials. 22 Its conclusion
on such influence merits repetition:
To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived
notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without
more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective
juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible
standard. 23
This statement is astounding in that it admits that pretrial
publicity through the various news media is unavoidable. It ad-
mits that pretrial publicity, of necessity, may take from an accused
person his presumption of innocence and shift some of the burden
of proof from the state. It accords to the right of a free press a
greater dignity than the right to a fair trial. Yet, Justice Jackson
once wrote in the course of an opinion that:
2 1 Note, "Controlling Press and Radio Influence on Trials", 63 Harv. L. Rev.
840, 842 (1950).22 Irvin v. Dowd, supra note 14, at 722 (1961).
281d. at 723.
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The right of the people to have a free press is a vital one,
but so is the right to have a calm and fair trial, free from out-
side pressures and influences. Every other right, including the
right of a free press itself, may depend on the ability to get
a judicial hearing as dispassionate and impartial as the weak-
ness inherent in men will permit.24
If anyone entertains any doubt that the problem now under
discussion is a serious one let him read Justice Frankfurter's con-
curring opinion, in setting aside a death sentence for murder, in
which he described the proceeding as "a miscarriage of justice due
to anticipatory trial by newspapers instead of trial in court before
a jury."25 His further commentary deserves quotation here:
Not a Term passes without this Court being importuned
to review convictions, had in States throughout the country,
in which substantial claims are made that a jury trial has been
distorted because of inflammatory newspaper accounts-too
often, as in this case, with the prosecutor's collaboration-
exerting pressures upon potential jurors before trial and even
during the course of trial, thereby making it extremely dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to secure a jury capable of taking in,
free of prepossessions, evidence submitted in open court. In-
deed such extraneous influences, in violation of the decencies
guaranteed by our Constitution, are some times so powerful
that an accused is forced, as a practical matter, to forego trial
by jury.. .. For one reason or another this Court does not
undertake to review all such envenomed state prosecutions.
But, again and again, such disregard of fundamental fairness
is so flagrant that the Court is compelled, as it was only a
week ago, to reverse a conviction in which prejudicial news-
paper intrusion has poisoned the outcome .... 26
Proceeding from generalities to specifics, the following pub-
licity should be considered prejudicial in criminal prosecutions:
1. Publication of or comment on statements by investi-
gating officers which point the finger of guilt at particular per-
sons.
2 7
24 Craig v. Harney, 831 U.S. 367, 394- 395 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
25 Irvin v. Dowd, supra note 14, at 729 (1961).
26 Id. at 730.
27 Not infrequently officers will state to members of the press, "We have our
man all right. It s an open and shut case." Or they make other statements of
similar import. Officers like for the public to know they are doing their duty and
do not like for the press to think that they are "dragging their feet."
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2. Publication of or comment on statements made by pro-
secuting attorneys as to the guilt of the accused.28
3. Public statements by defense counsel that his client will
make a certain defense as insanity or self-defense. Such state-
ments on the merits are admissions of guilt and inject the
necessity of interposing an affirmative defense.29
4. Reference to other crimes committed by the defendant,
since, with some exceptions, this is reference to inadmissible
evidence and highly prejudicial.30
5. Publication of statements that an accused has confessed
to the crime charged.3 1
6. Comment by news media on refusal of an accused to
28 In State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A. 2d 841, 852, (1964) §§ 5 and
20 of the Canons of Professional Ethics are construed to prohibit prosecutors, and
members of their staffs from commenting to news media on such matters as
alleged confessions, inculpatory admissions by an accused, or to the effect that
the case is open and shut against the defendant, or with reference to prior arrests
or convictions of other crimes.29 State v. Van Duyne, supra note 23, also applies the ban on pretrial state-
ments to defense counsel.30 In Richardson v. Commonwealth, 312 S. W. 2d 470 (Ky. 1958), the de-
fendant was tried for the alleged performance of an abortion. During the course
of the trial, the Commonwealths Attorney told newsmen that if he did not
get a conviction there were other abortion charges he would bring against the
defendant. The jurors were released to go home for the night and the majority of
them read or heard about the article concerning the prosecutor's statement. Thejudge examined the jurors in chambers the next morning and all swore they could
try the case impartially. The defendant was convicted, and the conviction was
sustained upon appeal.31 In numerous highly publicized cases there are confessions which may or
may not be true and which, if true, may not be admissible in evidence due to
hsical or psychological coercion, or even due to failure to promptly arraign in
eeral courts. For example, see Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
In Singer v. State, supra note 19. and Irvin v. Dowd, supra note 14, there were
highly publicized confessions which, along with other prejudicial publicity, led
to the setting aside of murder convictions.
Why do men confess to commission of crimes? One may confess:
1. To ease the conscience of guilt.
2. Due to psychological or physical coercion.
3. To shield a friend or relative.
4. In an attempt to establish an alibi for commission of another and more
serious crime.
5. To get a lighter sentence when "behind the eight ball" due to highly in-
criminating circumstantial evidence.
6. Because of an abnormal mind.
It follows that, except for reason number one, confessions may be highly un-
reliable and not admissible against the accused. So until admitted by the court
for consideration by the jury a confession should not be regarded as "news".
196]
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cooperate with police investigations, as in refusal to take a lie
detector test.32
7. Any publicized comment on the "facts" of an occurrence
in a manner calculated to arouse public passion or prejudice,
and perhaps even calling for the conviction of an accused
person. 33
8. Publication of photographs of the scene of an occurrence
which may prove to have been a crime.
34
9. Publication of photographs of accused persons where
identity is an issue. 35
10. Investigation and reporting on a crime by a newspaper36
on its own initiative.
3 7
3 2 Refusal to take a lie detector test may, to the layman, be tantamount to an
admission of guilt. Yet, at this writing, no court of last resort in any state has up-
held the admission of lie detector test results. See Conley v. Commonwealth, 382
S.W. 2d 865 (Ky. 1964) where the appellate court reversed a conviction for
admission of test results unfavorable though the state and the defendant made a
written stipulation that the results would be admissible for or against either as
the case might be.
33 Two years ago in the city of the writer's residence a young newsboy on
a bicycle was struck and killed by an elderly man driving a truck. It was a tragic
event and local newspapers played it up to the hilt. Officer's statements that the
man staggered when he got out of the truck, that he reeked of alcohol, and that
an empty whisky bottle was found in the truck. The next day one paper carried
a lengthy editorial based on its ex parte conclusion that the driver was in fact
intoxicate d demanding his conviction in no uncertain terms. This is commonpractice known to all iterate persons.(
3 4 In the case commented on in note 33, supra, the newspapers publishedpictures of the dead boy, his crushed bicycle and newspapers strewn on the
snow-spotted road. The gorier the pictures the greater delight newsmen take in
reproducing them.
3  This practice was condemned in King v. Daily Mirror [1927] 1 K. B., 45.In the opinion reference was made to the power of suggestion when the whole
country was invited to scrutinize the features of a person accused of crime.
6 Rex v. Editor and Printers and Publishers of the "Evening Standard.
40 T.L.R. 883 (K.B. 1924), The Standard was held in contempt of court for
iaving hied private detectives to investigat a killing and published what was
uncovered at a time when a charge of murder had been made and a trial was to
take place.
TIt was held in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (5.D. Ohio 1964)
that a change of venue should have been granted because of prejudicial newspaper
coverage. The decision was reversed on the ground that the petitioner had failed
to sustain the burden of demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the trial although
it had been preceded and pervaded by publicity, 346 F. 2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965).
Whether that burden has been sustained, the court said, is determined by an
independent review of the vor dire examination. The court found the newspaper
publicity complained of was of a nature to neither inspire confidence in the news
media nor create lasting impressions of the defendant's guilt. "Surmise, con-
jecture, and accusation were substituted for confession, criminal record, or
criminal evidence" (p. 720). On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
the case No. 490, argued on February 28, 1966.
WHAT CoNSTTrr.ES PRmjumciA PuBLicm
11. Slanted publications during the course of a trial through
misleading headlines and one-sided selection of material which
unfairly presents the weight of the evidence and the credibility
of witnesses. 3
We have detailed some of the more flagrant and frequently
occurring procedures followed by news media which constitute
prejudicial publicity and which are likely to deny the consti-
tutional right to a fair trial. The duty to provide a fair trial
rests with those branches of government at all levels which are
entrusted with the duty of administering criminal justice. This
duty cannot be escaped nor can such a trial be excused on the
ground that, under existing conditions, publicity given crimes
is so generally disseminated that it is impossible to impanel a
jury of persons who are free from knowledge of a crime and of
preconceived opinions of the guilt of the accused. Rather the
answer is to remove the conditions which create the extra-
judicial knowledge and preconceived opinions.
Conclusion
The certain way to insure a fair trial is to follow the practice
of the English system under which the courts hold it to be a
contempt of court for news media to engage in pretrial com-
ment on the events, facts, statements or investigations involving
a crime, insofar as such comment tends to affect the determina-
tion of pending causes. 3 But under the American system of
administration of justice our courts have, except in rare in-
stances, failed to utilize the law of contempt by publication, and
the Supreme Court of the United States has not, as yet, upheld
a contempt by publication finding in a state court.40 Further-
more, state legislatures have not seen fit to pass legislation which
3 8 Slanting of news reports is not necessarily intentional, but may be due
to the need for condensation, the reporter's misconception of legal points and
issues, or his desire to dramatize spicy or gory details. See Grinnell, Modern
Murder Trials and Newspapers, 88 Mantic Monthly 662 (1901). For a good
example of distorted treatment of a news story by nearly 100 newspapers, see
Simpson, The Case History of a Scientific News Story, 92 Science (NS) 148
(1940).
39 See 8 Halsbury's Laws of England, Contempt of Court, §- 12, 9-10 (3d
ed. 1945); Coodhart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English Law, 48
Harv. L. Rev. 885 (1935).
40 Concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,
730 (1961).
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
would restrict the publication of matter affecting criminal pros-
ecutions. Rather, the trend has been to grant the press the right
to publish such matters irrespective of the harmful result on
the right to trial by an impartial jury.41
What then is the answer to this enigma if continuance,
change of venue, or a new trial, with attendant delay and ex-
pense, does not provide a remedy. There are at least two al-
ternatives. One is to enforce the canons of ethics with their ban
on the giving out of information on pending trials by prose-
cutors and attorneys. This should be accompanied by police
agencies not publicizing the results of their investigations. As a
practical matter, these suggestions just will not work with news
media procedures that are so deeply entrenched.
The second alternative, and most feasible approach to the
problem, is for bar associations and news media to work to-
gether on what should be considered a common problem and
not a controversy in which the bar seeks to gag the press.42 The
purpose of this joint action should be a mutual code of ethics
in substance as follows:
1. The principles of free speech, a free press, and a fair
trial under due process of law are of equal significance in a
democratic form of government.
2. The bar in seeking to prevent prejudicial pretrial and
trial publicity does not seek to suppress legitimate crime news
coverage.
3. The press and other news media perform a necessary
public service in crime news coverage but should refrain from
opinionative comment or publication which is inflammatory
with respect to a particular person accused of crime.
41 See Sullivan, Contempts by Publication, Part Three, A Comparison of the
Functioning of the Law of Contempt by Publication in England and America
(Srd ed 191). Also see concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter in Pennekamp
v. State of Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 357 (1946).
42 This is the suggestion by President Lewis F. Powell, Jr. of the American
Bar Association. The ABA recently set up an Advisory Committee on Fair
Trial and Free Press, under chairmanship of Justice Paul C. Reardon of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in response to the recommendations of
the Warren Commission that there be joint consultation between the bar and the
press, radio and television in an effort to find fair solutions for the problems of
prejudicial news coverage. Powell said that the Reardon committe will welcome
consultation with responsible news media. A request for such a consultation has
come from the National Association of Broadcasters.-American Bar News Bul-
letin, Vol. 10, No. 2, p 8 (Feb. 15, 1965).
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WHAT CONSTrrUTEs PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY
4. Confessions, real or alleged, to commission of crime are
not news until judicially determined to be competent evidence
for the state.
5. It is not proper for a news report to express an opinion
as to the guilt of an accused person, who is presumed innocent
until proven guilty.
6. It is the legitimate office of news media to advise the
public on the progress of criminal investigations and trials
through impartial comment on all pertinent facts. To this end,
the various news media should have access to all records and
proceedings not properly classified as confidential in the in-
terests of due process of law.
7. Prosecutors and defense attorneys violate their profes-
sional code of ethics in releasing statements reasonably cal-
culated to prejudice an accused person's right to a fair trial.
8. It is not the function of news media to shield the judi-
ciary from public opinion or just criticism.
The foregoing enumerations are not exhaustive and are not
set out as a model code. Such a code can result only from
mutual understanding after lengthy conferences. But they do
state certain fundamental specifics, as well as certain basic
generalities which may be subjected to detailed consideration.
And they suggest that the right to a fair trial can be better pro-
tected if the bar and news media look upon the issues of free
press and fair trial as a common problem and not a controversy
-in an atmosphere not clouded by hostility and recrimination.
ADDENDUM
After this issue went to press, the Supreme Court decided an
important case, involving prejudicial publicity, Sheppard v. Max-
well.' Termed a "classic case study of journalism out of control,"2
the Sheppard decision may well "become a milestone in the effort
to reconcile the constitutional rights of a free press with the
guarantee of a fair trial .... ,,3 The Court upheld Sheppard's bid
for habeas corpus by concluding he "did not receive -a fair trial
consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
' 34 U. S. L. Week 4451 (June 6, 1966).2 Newsweek, June 20, 1966, p. 64.
3 New York Times, June 7, 1966, p. 1, col. 5.
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ment .... "4 The state trial judge "did not fulfill his duty to pro-
tect Sheppard from the inherently prejudicial publicity which
saturated the community and to control disruptive influences in
the courtroom.... 5
The major responsibility for preventing trial by newspaper
was placed on public officials, not the press. The trial judge failed
to exercise his power to control milling masses of newsmen who
created a "carnival atmosphere ' 6 of continual bedlam in the
crammed courtroom. Thus Sheppard was deprived of that "judi-
cial serenity and calm to which he was entitled."7
The trial judge also failed to insure either the jury's or wit-
nesses' privacy or protection from massive publicity. Had the
court controlled the release of extrajudicial evidence and gossip
to the press by police officers, witnesses, and counsel for both
sides, then only newsworthy events properly unfolding in the
courtroom could have been reported.
The Court concluded that since correct procedures by the
trial judge "would have been sufficient to guarantee Sheppard a
fair trial . . .[we] do not consider what sanctions might be avail-
able against a recalcitrant press. . . ."s While deftly avoiding any
direct limitation on the freedom traditionally exercised by the
news media, the court faintly suggests that possibility of sanction
does exist.
The main thrust of the decision, however, is a stern warning
for the future to court officers. Noting the increasing prevalence
of'prejudicial news both prior to and during trials, the Court in-
structed judges to take strong protective measures by either
continuing or transferring trials, and, if necessary to insure fair-
ness, ordering new trials. It was also recommended to subject law-
yers to disciplinary action for divulging prejudicial information to
the press.
4 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 34 U. S. L. Week 4451 (June 6, 1966).
5 Id. at 4460.
6 Id. at 4458.
7 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, at 536 (1965).
8 Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra at 4458.
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